Review of issues related to the acquisition and management of container accommodation in the Northern Territory and the management of ACMS on prescribed communities 

Underpinning the NTER intervention and critical to its ongoing success was the introduction of GBMs as the point of contact for the Commonwealth within each Community.  To meet the timeframes demanded by government GBMs were initially identified via an expression of interest process addressed to SES and Executive Staff within FaHCSIA (see Attachment D), but was quickly broadened beyond FaHCSIA.  GBMs were brought on progressively by the Operations Centre via a recruitment process run by FaHCSIA National Office, People Branch.   That process is now run by the Operations Centre with National Office support but is being taken over by the NTO by 1 July 2008.  Currently 51 GBMs are engaged and service 72 communities.  A similar process was undertaken by DEEWR to recruit Commonwealth Employment Brokers who are also servicing prescribed communities.  GBMs and CEBs were intended to be co-located as far as accommodation was concerned and that is still the general intention.

The provision of suitable accommodation in the communities in prescribed areas was, and is, crucial to both the GBM and CEB roles. Initially, a stock of demountables, previously used at the Woomera and Baxter detention centres by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, were identified for this purpose.  However, it was determined that these were not appropriate for use in cyclone prone areas and that suitable demountable accommodation could not be provided from other sources within the timeframes involved.

Once it was determined that suitable demountable structures were not available, attention focused on the use of suitably fitted out containers as a short term (3/4 years) expedient because of their extensive and apparently satisfactory use in the mining industry under seemingly comparable conditions.  After inspection it was decided that they would be suitable as temporary accommodation on communities for resident and visiting government officers.  Illustrations of RW containers, including the inside of a typical accommodation container are provided at Attachment D.

In my opinion that decision was reasonable in the circumstances.

That said, even given the tight time constraints imposed by Government it would appear that little was done to confirm with other users that their containers were "fit for purpose' and that the ways in which they were being used was comparable to the use intended by the Commonwealth.  It is likely however that such enquires would not have had a material affect on the decision.

In order to meet that short term need for living and office accommodation a contract to lease appropriately fitted out shipping containers was entered into on 6 September 2007.  The supplier was Royal Wolf Trading (RW), a company providing customised containers for uses similar to that required by FaHCSIA, across a wide range of users including the mining industry in Qld, WA and the NT.  The fact that RW is a preferred supplier to the Department of Defence was relevant to the decision to proceed with them as a supplier.

Because a stock of appropriately fitted out containers was not available in Australia, RW contracted to provide containers fitted out in China.

As identified at paragraph 24 the fact that it was a Royal Wolf were preferred suppliers to the Department of Defence was relevant to the decision to use containers supplied by RW.  Enquiries made as part of this review identified that although the Australian Defence Force (ADF) use RW the containers they are fitted out by Defence either in Australia or on site overseas.  I am advised that in every case Australian materials are used in the fit out.  Defence has advised that it had not experienced fume problems.

Given the expectation that the containers would be required for at least two to three years, and that the simple payback period if they were to be purchased was 2.4 years, on 21 September 2007, the lease arrangement was converted to a purchase arrangement.  I believe that was appropriate.  By 25 October 2007 a total of 150 containers had been purchased.  An additional 45 containers were purchased on or after 18 January 2008 although the fumes issue had by then been recognised as a problem.  Only 12-15 of the 195 containers purchased have yet to be installed.

Installation was carried out under a contract with Indigenous Business Australia (IBA) a statutory corporation established under the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (CATSI) Act.  By agreement, IBA subcontracted the work to Spinbrook Pty Ltd trading as NT Link and Notaras Pty Ltd (NT Link).

I have not reviewed the contractual arrangements in detail but from what I have seen I consider that the documentation raises a number of issues.  I am aware that FaHCSIA’s Legal and Compliance Group is reviewing those contractual arrangements.

The acquisition and installation of the containers was managed by NO through the contract with IBA.  I am informed that the configuration of the accommodation complex was developed by NT Link as part of their contract with IBA.  I am further informed that no professional or technical advice was separately involved in the design of the configuration of the complexes and that the design was agreed by both the Operations Centre and NO.

A typical complex currently consists of four accommodation units, a laundry/kitchen/dining unit and an office unit.  Apart from the office unit, the other units are grouped around a central, elevated, secure, insect screened and roofed common use breezeway.  The individual configuration is dependant on site considerations but broadly the set up is as identified above and as illustrated at Figure 1.

The complexes exhibit a number of design faults which were reported by GBMs.  A major and illustrative issue has been the "flooding' of the breezeway rendering it effectively unusable during the wet.  This has happened because insufficient roof overhang was provided.  Arrangements are in hand to extend the roofing if and when the containers are to be reoccupied.  This which will remediate the problem but at a significant cost which could have been avoided.

The explanation given for not providing adequate roofing is that the leasing arrangement originally entered into precluded any modification to the containers which more extensive roofing would have required.  That ceased to be an issue once the decision was made to purchase the containers.  There is no evidence however that before the decision to purchase was made there was any attempt to negotiate an arrangement that would have permitted an agreed modification to the containers.  At the time the decision to purchase was made no containers had been delivered.  I have found no evidence that once the decision to purchase was made the issue of the adequacy of the roofing was revisited.  It would seem likely that the significance of the inadequacy of the roofing was simply not appreciated until the flooding happened.

Other design issues relating to liveability and security have been identified.  They range from potential fire hazards which could see occupants unable to exit through the breezeway (which, along with a number of other problems, could have been solved, admittedly at some cost both as to the price and time by the containers having a window as is the case with the kitchen containers), through to the occupants being unable to secure the heavy container doors in the open position giving rise to the possibility of them being locked in. Presently the doors can only be opened through ninety degrees without them blocking the light and ventilation from "corridors' between the containers and at ninety degrees the doors intrude significantly into the breezeway space. At present they cannot be 'folded back' against the side of the container, but this and the capacity to secure them in that position, should be possible once the roofs and breezeways are extended and secured as is proposed.

In my opinion, the outer doors themselves present some OH&S risks.  The weight alone would cause problems for many officers.  A compounding problem is that when the doors are closed they are effectively self sealing resulting in them being difficult to open.  On one community visited during the review both the GBM and CEB (both males) had to work in tandem using a "hammer' and lever to open the containers, at some risk to their persons.

It would seem that at least some of these problems could have been avoided had appropriate professional advice been sought and acted upon both at the time of acquiring the containers and in the design of the complexes.

A significant issue for some of the officers who have used the containers is the lack of any private space apart from their quite cramped bedroom accommodation.  Depending on the outcome of the "fumes' issue this may be overcome by the intended provision of additional containers suitably fitted out.  The impact of the demountable accommodation to be provided will presumably impact on the need for these additional containers.

These accommodation shortcomings were compounded, particularly for some families, by the fact that some officers recruited early in the process were not made aware that they could be sharing the complex, or that the other occupant might have been a person of the opposite sex.  All officers are now appropriately informed of the possibility of living in shared often difficult, uncomfortable and relatively isolated circumstances.  The lack of suitable accommodation is a major issue for officers who have had to leave their partners.  A number of those officers expressed to me their enthusiasm for continuing in their roles if they could be joined by their partner.  I know that the Department is aware of this issue. I recommend that if possible action be taken to provide suitable "accompanied' accommodation.

Many of the underlying accommodation problems appear to have been overtaken by the immediacy of the fumes issue.  In my opinion however, that issue whilst now the most urgent issue, is not of itself reflective of any systemic failing.  The way in which the issue was handled however is. 

That said, I should record my view that having visited some of the affected containers, quiet apart from any health issue, those units were in my opinion uninhabitable at the fume concentrations experienced in those that had been closed up for any length of time.  Even where they had been "aired' for some time the smell was strong enough and unpleasant enough to make living in the containers problematic