There can be little doubt that the Australian Child Support Scheme has been a success in a great many ways. It has certainly led to a cultural change in community attitudes about the responsibility of both parents to provide for and support their children regardless of their relationship with each other. There is also evidence that the Scheme has made a significant difference to the financial circumstances of children in sole-parent households, with fewer living in poverty than before the Scheme was introduced.
84 However, child support remains an area of very high concern to the community, particularly to the people most directly engaged by it-separated parents. As well, many non-resident parents-already on low incomes at the time of their separation-tend to remain on low incomes for long periods. This situation, and other factors, can lead to poor compliance in meeting their child support liabilities, resulting in debts that become increasingly difficult to pay off.
This chapter looks at each of these issues-the impact of child support on the fi nancial circumstances of payees and payers, concerns about how the Scheme is currently operating, and the issues of payer compliance and debt, including the performance of the Child Support Agency (CSA) in this regard.
5.1 Financial impacts of the Scheme
All separated parents with children are able to register with the CSA, and 94% of those eligible to register do so.
85 At 30 June 2004 there were 713,000 CSA cases representing 661,000 paying parents, 657,000 payee parents and over 1.1 million children. Private Collect cases comprised 51.8% of these cases and 48.2% were CSA Collect.
In June 2004, the average annual child support liability under the Scheme was $2,570 for CSA Collect and $4,432 for Private Collect payer parents. If those clients on minimum liabilities are excluded, the figures are $4,470 and $5,900 respectively.
5.1.1 Taxpayers
The Child Support Scheme has helped to reduce the cost of relationship break down to taxpayers. As a result of the mandatory transfer, or deemed transfer, of child support between parents, expenditure on Family Tax Benefit (FTB) was reduced by an estimated $433.5 million in 2002-03.
5.1.2 Payee families
An analysis of data from Australian Bureau of Statistics income surveys shows that, in the period 1982 to 1997-98, the proportion of children in sole-parent families benefiting from child support payments rose from 12% to 31%. Over this period, the average amount of child support received by female-headed sole-parent families also increased-from $12 a week in 1982 to $41 a week in 1997-98 (both amounts in 1997-98 dollars). Without these payments, it is estimated that the incidence of child poverty would have been around 1.2% higher (representing 58,000 children) over this period than it otherwise was.
86
5.1.3 Payers
Many non-resident parents are already on low incomes when they separate from their partners and tend to remain on low incomes over a long period afterwards. The authors of a study that tracked a large group of male non-resident parents over a four-year period from when they first registered with the CSA in 1997 described the group's financial situation over this period as one of 'prevailing and persisting low incomes'.
87 In fact, among the parents aged 25-44, the proportions reporting very low incomes actually increased marginally (from 39.7% to 42.4%) over the period of the study.
88 At the same time, there was also a significant accumulation of child support debt among payers in the very low income group. Their average annual child support liability in 2001 was $679 but their average debt was $861. The authors attribute this, in the main, to the payers' continuing low-income status.
Australian Institute of Family Studies (AIFS) researchers used data from the Institute's
Australian Divorce Transitions Project to determine whether the Child Support Scheme was having a detrimental effect on the economic wellbeing of payer parents.
89 Data analysis revealed a detrimental impact for a small percentage of payers in the survey (all of whom were in the workforce): the proportion of payers with incomes below the Henderson poverty line increased from 3% before child support was being deducted to 7% when payments were being made.
90 In another study, which sought information on payers' views on the affordability of paying child support, payers and payees with a child support assessment of $260 were surveyed. Of those meeting their liabilities, 59% reported that they could do so only by reducing expenditure on other items, including food. Not being able to afford child support payments was the main reason given by non-paying respondents for not meeting their liabilities.
91 As noted in Chapter 4, about one-quarter of payer parents are reliant on income support (with about half of these being on Newstart Allowance). Consistent with this, payers have much lower rates of employment and labour force attachment than do their counterparts in the general population. For example, Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data for 2001 shows that, of non-resident parents aged 18-64 who reported having a child support liability, 75.1% were employed, 10.1% were unemployed and 14.8% were not in the labour force. The equivalent figures for those in the same demographic group but without a child support liability were 89.7% employed, 3.5% unemployed and 6.8% not in the labour force.
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5.2 Concerns about the Scheme
That the Child Support Scheme has proven controversial is not surprising. The Scheme operates at the intersection of family law, income support and the tax system. It sometimes seems to act as a lens for intensifying personal resentment on the part of those who feel aggrieved by court decisions on children's living arrangements and the division of property, or by the circumstances that resulted in separation, or the unplanned birth of a child. Even in the absence of conflict between the parents, it may prove difficult to develop a mechanism that both parents will consider fair.
There are a number of specific concerns that have been voiced repeatedly about the Scheme, most recently in submissions made to the House of Representatives Inquiry into Child Custody Arrangements in the Event of Family Separation.
92 Many submissions expressed concerns that:
- the costs of children are not well reflected in the formula;
- the disparity between the payer's exempt income and payee disregarded income is inequitable;
- the costs of contact to the non-resident parent are only reflected in the formula if the children spend at least 110 nights per year with each parent;
- child support liabilities are assessed against gross rather than net income;
- there is little incentive for either payers or payees to work;
- the costs of step-children are not adequately recognised;
- children are treated differently in first and second families; and
- property and court settlements are not reflected adequately in the formula.
Other issues frequently raised in submissions to the Inquiry include:
- some payers and payees avoid their child support obligations by minimising their reported income through cash-in-hand earnings;
- concern that 'capacity to pay' assessments either prevent contact parents from reducing their hours to provide care for children or result in debt;
- poor interaction with the income support system; and
- CSA administration problems.
5.2.1 Community attitudes towards the Scheme: fairness and effi ciency issues
The Australian Institute of Family Studies (AIFS) was commissioned by the Taskforce in December 2004 to conduct a national survey of community attitudes to the Scheme.
93 Data for the survey was obtained through telephone interviews conducted over a three-week period in January and February 2005 from two samples: a general population sample comprising 1,001 people aged 18-64 who were not involved with child support and a national random sample of 620 separated/divorced parents with at least one child aged under 18.
The survey data thus represents the views of two distinct groups: those within the ambit of the child support system 'looking out' (resident mothers and non-resident fathers- the two most common post-separation parent groups), and those outside the system 'looking in' (men and women who had not experienced separation).
The survey collected information on respondents' attitudes on a range of aspects of the Child Support Scheme. Figure 5.1 shows the pattern of responses of resident mothers and non-resident fathers in regard to their opinion of the Scheme's functioning.
Figure 5.1: Do you think that, overall, the child support system is working well? Attitudes of separated parents with at least one dependent child
Note: Response options were not offered; χ2 (2) = 9.56,
p<.01.
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Most non-resident fathers (62%) maintained that the Scheme was
not working well, while only one-third believed that it was. Resident mothers, on the other hand, were fairly evenly divided on this issue.
Separated parents' views as to whether they thought the Scheme was fair to both parents are summarised in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Do you think that the child support system is 'fair' for both parents? Attitudes of separated parents with at least one dependent child
Note: Response options were not offered; χ2 (2) = 30.53,
p<.001.
Around three-quarters of non-resident fathers believed that the Scheme was
not fair to both parents, while 18% said that it was fair. By contrast, the same proportion of resident mothers (46%) claimed it was fair as those who claimed it was not. Another 8% of these women and men volunteered that it was 'sometimes' fair.
In summary, although non-resident fathers tended to believe that the Scheme was not working well and/or was not fair to both parents, they were likely in particular to be negative about the issue of fairness. Resident mothers, on the other hand, tended to be evenly divided on both issues.
5.3 Compliance with child support obligations
In this context, compliance is defined simply as the regular and timely payment by non-resident parents of their child support liabilities. The CSA is the main source of data on compliance, some of which is presented in its annual publication,
Child Support Scheme: Facts and Figures. Alternative data sources are relatively scarce. They include surveys conducted by AIFS and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and some smaller-scale studies conducted by other researchers.
5.3.1 Paying child support pre-Child Support Scheme
In order to provide some baseline data against which the performance of the Child Support Scheme can be judged in regard to compliance, it is necessary to examine the child support payment situation before the Scheme was introduced in 1988. Payment data for this period is even more limited than for the current period, with the main sources being AIFS researchers and the former Department of Social Security. Estimates from these sources range from around a quarter to around a third of resident parents receiving child support on a regular basis during the 1980s.
94 In terms of amounts, child support payments at this time are reported to have ranged from a weekly average of $10 per sole-parent family in 1982 to between $20 and $24 per week per child in the late 1980s.
95
5.3.2 Paying child support under the Child Support Scheme
Data sources on compliance include CSA administrative data, studies by the ABS, AIFS, and other researchers. These sources generally suggest improved levels of payment by non-resident parents, with compliance figures (as measured by the proportion of payee parents reporting receipt of child support) ranging from 40% to 50% in the 1990s, to around 60% in 2000.
96 Where payer parents have been surveyed on this topic, they have given a much higher estimate of their rate of compliance. For example, 79% of payer respondents in one study reported that they were paying child support, compared to 60% of payees in the same study who reported receiving it.
97 [
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5.3.3 CSA data on compliance
Unpublished data on CSA Collect payers (produced by the CSA for the Taskforce) provides a picture of compliance that is broadly in line with the findings of the studies referred to above.
As shown in Table 5.3, in 2003-04, while only 20% of CSA Collect payers failed to pay any of their liabilities, only 43% paid all of their liabilities. Table 5.4 (also derived from unpublished CSA data) shows levels of compliance by CSA Collect payers over the period of a month (May 2004). This provides a better indication of the timeliness of payments made to payees than that which can be gained from rates of compliance over a 12-month period.
Table 5.3: Payer Liability by % paid in current period (2003-04) for CSA collect active clients, June 2004
| Payer liability ($A) |
Paid 0% |
Paid 1 - <25% |
Paid 25 - <50% |
Paid 50 - <75% |
Paid 75 - <100% |
Paid 100% |
Paid over 100% |
Total |
| |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
| Negative |
9,707 |
100.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
9,707 |
100.0 |
| 0 |
16,407 |
100.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
16,407 |
100.0 |
| 1 - 259 |
6,852 |
14.6 |
2,291 |
4.9 |
2,779 |
5.9 |
3,417 |
7.3 |
6,538 |
13.9 |
2,372 |
5.0 |
22,758 |
48.4 |
47,0007 |
100.0 |
| 260 |
13,449 |
33.2 |
1,303 |
3.2 |
1,374 |
3.4 |
1,667 |
4.1 |
4,494 |
11.1 |
8,326 |
20.5 |
9,944 |
24.5 |
40,557 |
100.0 |
| 261 - 500 |
2,802 |
8.3 |
2,794 |
8.3 |
2,429 |
7.2 |
4,155 |
12.3 |
11,795 |
35.1 |
1,012 |
3.0 |
8,664 |
25.7 |
33,651 |
100.0 |
| 501 - 1,000 |
2,664 |
14.1 |
1,992 |
10.5 |
2,346 |
12.4 |
1,549 |
8.2 |
2,279 |
12.0 |
1,325 |
7.0 |
6,798 |
35.9 |
18,953 |
100.0 |
| 1,001 - 2,000 |
5,554 |
16.2 |
4,676 |
13.6 |
2,522 |
7.3 |
2,735 |
8.0 |
4,918 |
14.3 |
2,679 |
7.8 |
11,267 |
32.8 |
34,351 |
100.0 |
| 2,001 - 3,000 |
2,936 |
10.6 |
3,033 |
10.9 |
1,872 |
6.8 |
2,261 |
8.2 |
4,908 |
17.7 |
2,607 |
9.4 |
10,095 |
36.4 |
27,712 |
100.0 |
| 3,001 - 4,000 |
1,622 |
7.4 |
1,889 |
8.6 |
1,342 |
6.1 |
1,767 |
8.1 |
4,483 |
20.4 |
2,423 |
11.0 |
8,410 |
38.3 |
21,936 |
100.0 |
| 4,001 - 5,000 |
834 |
5.0 |
1,214 |
7.3 |
953 |
5.7 |
1,267 |
7.6 |
3,638 |
21.7 |
2,107 |
12.6 |
6,727 |
40.2 |
16,740 |
100.0 |
| 5,001 - 6,000 |
582 |
4.4 |
856 |
6.5 |
693 |
5.3 |
949 |
7.2 |
2,919 |
22.1 |
1,872 |
14.2 |
5,309 |
40.3 |
13,180 |
100.0 |
| 6,001 - 7,000 |
459 |
4.7 |
581 |
5.9 |
485 |
5.0 |
655 |
6.7 |
2,182 |
22.3 |
1,474 |
15.1 |
3,939 |
40.3 |
9,775 |
100.0 |
| 7,001 - 8,000 |
295 |
4.0 |
460 |
6.3 |
366 |
5.0 |
446 |
6.1 |
1,691 |
23.2 |
1,155 |
15.8 |
2,887 |
39.5 |
7,300 |
100.0 |
| 8,001 - 9,000 |
202 |
3.8 |
324 |
6.1 |
257 |
4.8 |
386 |
7.3 |
1,221 |
23.0 |
857 |
16.1 |
2,063 |
38.9 |
5,310 |
100.0 |
| 9,001 - 10,000 |
145 |
3.7 |
247 |
6.3 |
201 |
5.1 |
241 |
6.2 |
931 |
23.8 |
649 |
16.6 |
1,495 |
38.2 |
3,909 |
100.0 |
| 10,001 - 15,000 |
358 |
3.7 |
592 |
6.2 |
540 |
5.6 |
644 |
6.7 |
2,216 |
23.1 |
1,530 |
16.0 |
3,708 |
38.7 |
9,586 |
100.0 |
| 15,001 - 20,000 |
155 |
5.0 |
249 |
8.0 |
189 |
6.1 |
224 |
7.2 |
704 |
22.7 |
465 |
15.0 |
1,121 |
36.1 |
3,107 |
100.0 |
| 20,001 - 25,000 |
60 |
6.3 |
121 |
12.7 |
75 |
7.9 |
64 |
6.7 |
208 |
21.8 |
126 |
13.2 |
298 |
31.3 |
952 |
100.0 |
| 25,001 - 30,000 |
38 |
6.5 |
70 |
11.9 |
38 |
6.5 |
29 |
4.9 |
120 |
20.4 |
110 |
18.7 |
183 |
31.1 |
588 |
100.0 |
| 30,001 - 35,000 |
25 |
11.5 |
48 |
22.1 |
16 |
7.4 |
13 |
6.0 |
35 |
16.1 |
32 |
14.7 |
48 |
22.1 |
217 |
100.0 |
| 35,001 - 40,000 |
18 |
18.6 |
30 |
30.9 |
14 |
144 |
5 |
5.2 |
11 |
11.3 |
9 |
9.3 |
10 |
10.3 |
97 |
100.0 |
| 40,001 - 45,000 |
16 |
30.8 |
27 |
51.9 |
3 |
5.8 |
0 |
0.0 |
3 |
5.8 |
1 |
1.9 |
2 |
3.8 |
52 |
100.0 |
| 45,001 - 50,000 |
9 |
23.1 |
19 |
48.7 |
4 |
10.3 |
3 |
7.7 |
2 |
5.1 |
0 |
0.0 |
2 |
5.1 |
39 |
100.0 |
| 50,001 - 55,000 |
10 |
30.3 |
18 |
54.5 |
3 |
9.1 |
1 |
3.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
1 |
3.0 |
33 |
100.0 |
| 55,001 - 60,000 |
6 |
33.3 |
9 |
50.0 |
1 |
5.6 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
1 |
5.6 |
1 |
5.6 |
18 |
100.0 |
| 60,001 - 65,000 |
6 |
54.5 |
2 |
18.2 |
1 |
9.1 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
1 |
9.1 |
1 |
9.1 |
11 |
100.0 |
| 65,001 - 70,000 |
6 |
50.0 |
5 |
41.7 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
1 |
8.3 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
12 |
100.0 |
| 70,001 - 75,000 |
3 |
50.0 |
2 |
33.3 |
1 |
16.7 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
6 |
100.0 |
| 75,001 - 80,000 |
6 |
42.9 |
8 |
57.1 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
14 |
100.0 |
| 80,001 - 85,000 |
1 |
25.0 |
2 |
50.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
1 |
25.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
4 |
100.0 |
| 85,001 - 90,000 |
1 |
14.3 |
5 |
71.4 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
1 |
14.3 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
7 |
100.0 |
| 90,001 - 95,000 |
3 |
100.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
3 |
100.0 |
| 95,001 - 100,000 |
2 |
40.0 |
2 |
40.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
1 |
20.0 |
5 |
100.0 |
| 100,001 - 110,000 |
5 |
71.4 |
2 |
28.6 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
7 |
100.0 |
| 110,001 - 120,000 |
2 |
66.7 |
1 |
33.3 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
3 |
100.0 |
| 120,001 - 130,000 |
1 |
50.0 |
1 |
50.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
2 |
100.0 |
| 130,001 - 140,000 |
2 |
100.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
2 |
100.0 |
| 140,001 - 150,000 |
1 |
33.3 |
2 |
66.7 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
3 |
100.0 |
| 160,001 - 170,000 |
1 |
100.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
1 |
100.0 |
| 200,001 + |
1 |
50.0 |
1 |
50.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
2 |
100.0 |
| Total |
65,246 |
20.3 |
22,876 |
7.1 |
18,504 |
2.8 |
22,479 |
7.0 |
55,298 |
17.2 |
31,133 |
9.7 |
105,730 |
32.9 |
321,266 |
100.0 |
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Table 5.4: Payer child support income by amount paid in May 2004 for CSA collect active cases
| Payer child support |
Paid 1 - <25% |
Paid 25 - <50% |
Paid 50 - <75% |
Paid 75 - <100% |
Paid 100% |
Paid over 100% |
Total |
| income($A) |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
| 0 |
20,365 |
46.5 |
774 |
1.8 |
1,584 |
3.6 |
4,036 |
9.2 |
5,841 |
13.3 |
11,210 |
25.6 |
43,810 |
100.0 |
| 1-1,000 |
715 |
44.4 |
14 |
0.9 |
85 |
5.3 |
196 |
12.2 |
95 |
5.9 |
505 |
31.4 |
1,610 |
100.0 |
| 1,001 - 2,000 |
755 |
48.8 |
28 |
1.8 |
96 |
6.2 |
157 |
10.1 |
80 |
5.2 |
432 |
27.9 |
1,548 |
100.0 |
| 2,001 - 3,000 |
759 |
45.8 |
30 |
1.8 |
84 |
5.1 |
189 |
11.4 |
79 |
4.8 |
515 |
31.1 |
1,656 |
100.0 |
| 3,001 - 4,000 |
1,027 |
50.3 |
25 |
1.2 |
105 |
5.1 |
189 |
9.3 |
117 |
5.7 |
577 |
28.3 |
2,040 |
100.0 |
| 4,001 - 5,000 |
1,372 |
48.0 |
44 |
1.5 |
150 |
5.2 |
274 |
9.6 |
134 |
4.7 |
885 |
31.0 |
2,859 |
100.0 |
| 5,001 - 6,000 |
1,985 |
48.9 |
60 |
1.5 |
208 |
5.1 |
401 |
9.9 |
186 |
4.6 |
1,217 |
30.0 |
4,057 |
100.0 |
| 6,001 - 7,000 |
2,952 |
48.3 |
109 |
1.8 |
310 |
5.1 |
620 |
10.1 |
223 |
3.6 |
1,901 |
31.1 |
6,115 |
100.0 |
| 7,001 - 8,000 |
4,405 |
45.2 |
205 |
2.1 |
608 |
6.2 |
1,138 |
11.7 |
246 |
2.5 |
3,151 |
32.3 |
9,753 |
100.0 |
| 8,001 - 9,000 |
8,273 |
41.0 |
422 |
2.1 |
1,350 |
6.7 |
2,803 |
13.9 |
446 |
2.2 |
6,877 |
34.1 |
20,171 |
100.0 |
| 9,001 - 10,000 |
11,006 |
36.6 |
589 |
2.0 |
2,196 |
7.3 |
4,449 |
14.8 |
670 |
2.2 |
11,160 |
37.1 |
30,070 |
100.0 |
| 10,001 - 15,000 |
21,290 |
43.1 |
1,094 |
2.2 |
3,098 |
6.3 |
6,129 |
12.4 |
1,964 |
4.0 |
15,796 |
32,0 |
49,371 |
100.0 |
| 15,001 - 20,000 |
11,193 |
52.6 |
1,023 |
4.8 |
585 |
2.8 |
907 |
4.3 |
1,813 |
8.5 |
5,750 |
27.0 |
21,271 |
100.0 |
| 20,001 - 25,000 |
19,011 |
58.1 |
678 |
2.1 |
785 |
2.4 |
1,395 |
4.3 |
2,813 |
8.6 |
8,024 |
24.5 |
32,706 |
100.0 |
| 25,001 - 30,000 |
7,944 |
34.4 |
597 |
2.6 |
774 |
3.4 |
1,555 |
6.7 |
3,884 |
16.8 |
8,349 |
36.1 |
23,103 |
100.0 |
| 30,001 - 35,000 |
6,264 |
28.5 |
503 |
2.3 |
675 |
3.1 |
1,632 |
7.4 |
4,863 |
22.1 |
8,046 |
36.6 |
21,983 |
100.0 |
| 35,001 - 40,000 |
4,421 |
24.4 |
420 |
2.3 |
633 |
3.5 |
1,423 |
7.9 |
4,636 |
25.6 |
6,566 |
36.3 |
18,099 |
100.0 |
| 40,001 - 45,000 |
2,945 |
21.5 |
319 |
2.3 |
420 |
3.1 |
1,108 |
8.1 |
4,122 |
30.1 |
4,786 |
34.9 |
13,700 |
100.0 |
| 45,001 - 50,000 |
2,072 |
19.8 |
248 |
2.4 |
380 |
3.6 |
837 |
8.0 |
3,404 |
32.5 |
3,545 |
33.8 |
10,486 |
100.0 |
| 50,001 - 55,000 |
1,305 |
17.5 |
130 |
1.7 |
255 |
3.4 |
588 |
7.9 |
2,789 |
37.5 |
2,375 |
31.9 |
7,442 |
100.0 |
| 55,001 - 60,000 |
918 |
16.4 |
115 |
2.1 |
182 |
3.2 |
503 |
9.0 |
2,185 |
39.0 |
1,699 |
30.3 |
5,602 |
100.0 |
| 60,001 - 65,000 |
658 |
16.7 |
73 |
1.9 |
160 |
4.1 |
344 |
8.7 |
1,530 |
38.8 |
1,177 |
29.9 |
3,942 |
100.0 |
| 65,001 - 70,000 |
429 |
15.8 |
73 |
2.7 |
105 |
3.9 |
242 |
8.9 |
1,041 |
38.4 |
818 |
30.2 |
2,708 |
100.0 |
| 70,001 - 75,000 |
316 |
17.1 |
46 |
2.5 |
63 |
3.4 |
163 |
8.8 |
687 |
37.1 |
578 |
31.2 |
1,853 |
100.0 |
| 75,001 - 80,000 |
235 |
17.0 |
27 |
2.0 |
53 |
3.8 |
120 |
8.7 |
478 |
34.5 |
471 |
34.0 |
1,384 |
100.0 |
| 80,001 - 85,000 |
174 |
17.5 |
36 |
3.6 |
37 |
3.7 |
86 |
8.6 |
348 |
35.0 |
314 |
31.6 |
995 |
100.0 |
| 85,001 - 90,000 |
145 |
19.7 |
17 |
2.3 |
29 |
3.9 |
48 |
6.5 |
279 |
37.9 |
219 |
29.7 |
737 |
100.0 |
| 90,001 - 95,000 |
94 |
17.5 |
15 |
2.8 |
26 |
4.8 |
51 |
9.5 |
173 |
32.2 |
178 |
33.1 |
537 |
100.0 |
| 95,001 - 100,000 |
90 |
22.3 |
9 |
2.2 |
12 |
3.0 |
40 |
9.9 |
128 |
31.7 |
125 |
30.9 |
404 |
100.0 |
| 100,001 - 110,000 |
92 |
17.2 |
9 |
1.7 |
19 |
3.6 |
53 |
9.9 |
207 |
38.7 |
155 |
29 .0 |
535 |
100.0 |
| 110,001 - 120,000 |
212 |
17.4 |
19 |
1.6 |
35 |
2.9 |
109 |
8.9 |
490 |
40.2 |
354 |
29.0 |
1,219 |
100.0 |
| 120,001 - 130,000 |
135 |
22.1 |
16 |
2.6 |
26 |
4.2 |
69 |
11.3 |
231 |
37.7 |
135 |
22.1 |
612 |
100.0 |
| 140,001 - 150,000 |
1 |
100.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
1 |
100.0 |
| Total |
133,558 |
39.0 |
7,767 |
2.3 |
15,128 |
4.4 |
31,854 |
9.3 |
46,182 |
13.5 |
107,890 |
31.5 |
342,379 |
100.0 |
Note: The reason why some payers who reported zero Child Support Income may have met their child support liability is because they may have managed to pay arrears.
In contrast to the data in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, the CSA's published data on compliance (as provided in its annual
Facts and Figures report) tells the compliance story in a less straightforward way. Because the CSA assumes 100% compliance by Private Collect payers, it collects compliance data only in respect of CSA Collect cases. It publishes this data either as representing CSA Collect cumulative credits and liabilities, or combined with the assumed 100%-compliant Private Collect cases, as representing overall compliance rates. This approach does not provide a clear picture of actual compliance rates.
As well, the CSA uses a
cumulative collection rate (that is, the proportion of liabilities collected over the period since the inception of the Child Support Scheme) in its compliance reporting, rather than an annual figure. According to the CSA's
Facts and Figures 2003-04 report, these cumulative collection rates increased gradually from around 70% (of liabilities collected since 1988) in the early 1990s, rising to above 85% in the late 1990s and to just under 90% by June 2004.
It is not clear from these published statistics on collection rates how the CSA has treated, in its reporting on cumulative collection rates, those who cannot be traced. This group ought to be clearly represented in the published statistics on collection rates.