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In my opinion neither the Operations Centre nor NO responded effectively to the OH&S issues related to the use of the container accommodation well.
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One cause for my concern is that, despite it being recognised that the 'smell' issue had potential OH&S implications it took from 8 November 2007 until the 25th January 2008 for the Departments OH&S staff to be involved, and a further two months before the OH&S recommendation, made following site inspections, to obtain an independent report into the fumes problem, was acted upon. Whilst during that time many emails passed to and fro, there was a real failure of initiative.
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I accept that from the 29th January 2008 the Department was effectively waiting, in my opinion far too patiently, for advice from RW. I note also the apparently unsupported advice of the 26th February 2008 from RW that the 'smell' did not have OH&S implications. However, in the continued absence of the promised 'data sheets', the technical report commissioned by RW, the increasing number of complaints, and the Departments own OH&S report I think more should have been done earlier. In the event it took until the 10th of April 2008 for the Department to obtain a copy of the 'initial report' prepared by Simmons and Bristow for RW, which I am informed was based on tests on one RW container in their own facility. That report, which bears the date 20 March 2008, identified raised levels of formaldehyde and recommended amongst other things, that 'persons who must enter the unit should wear appropriate personal protection masks and [that] sensitive individuals should not enter the unit'.
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Apparently based on that report, on the 10th April 2008 the Department, in my view acted very properly in immediately ordering that the containers be vacated. A decision on the future use of the containers depends on the medical assessment of the results of the testing done for the Department by CETEC. However, a consequence of that decision has been that at least some officers are travelling long distances in conditions that themselves entail serious OH&S risks.
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A further cause for that concern is that as previously identified, the OH&S concerns raised by GBMs with the Operations Centre and in the Department's OH&S report were by no means confined to the 'fumes' issue and raised serious questions about the installation standards. I have found no evidence of any overall plan to address those other issues in a coordinated and comprehensive way.
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Given the uncertainty surrounding the future use of the containers and whilst they remain unoccupied and or unused, it is now, in my opinion, reasonable that remediation of those other issue be delayed until the fumes issue is resolved. Given the lack of confidence in management exhibited by staff at the recall day I attended however I believe it is important that if the containers are to be used for accommodation those issues need to be addressed quickly and wherever possible before the units are reoccupied.
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The issues associated with the container accommodation in my opinion highlighted a real need for the Department to have a greater capacity to identify and deal with OH&S problems quickly, professionally and with authority. In that context I strongly support the decision to appoint an additional OH&S officer and to 'attach' that officer to the NTO. Until that appointment is made, however, I am informed that the effective investigative strength (ie not including officers involved in rehabilitation work) of the OH&S section is two persons, neither of whom have any formal OH&S qualifications. I have been impressed with the approach and enthusiasm demonstrated by the OH&S officer with respect to the container problems. It was, however, obvious that the officer involved was dealing with a number of urgent matters and that as a consequence had not pursued the container issues. Whilst clearly a decision for management, I believe there must be a question as to whether, given its size and the range of its operations, the Department can fulfil its OH&S obligations without a serious increase in staff numbers and without appropriately qualified staff, well supported by senior management.
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I am satisfied that, from a management viewpoint, any potential health risks from exposure to the fumes are now being investigated appropriately. I note however that there is considerable, and in my opinion understandable, concern among some officers that their individual circumstances in relation to that exposure may not be given sufficient attention in the event that a health risk is established. I recommend that in the event that a health risk is identified, arrangements be made to take proper account of the individual circumstances of officers exposed to the fumes and appropriate assurances to that extent be given now. I also recommend that all officers both past and present who have occupied the containers be kept appropriately informed of, and involved in, the development of the responses to the issues involved.